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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of the Estate
Case No. 950133-CA
of
MARION CATHERINE HOWES,
Priority 10
Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE
STEVENSON HOUSE WAS OWNED BY DECEDENT AND C. LEO HOWES AS JOINT
TENANTS AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
STEVENSON HOUSE DEVOLVED ON C. LEO HOWES BY OPERATION OF LAW.
The applicable standards of review are either under the clearly erroneous standard
as to factual determinations or the correction of error standard for legal determinations and
conclusions of law including those erroneously denominated as findings of fact. Alta Indus. Ltd.
v Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Sorenson v Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d
1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994); Edwards & Daniels Architects. Inc. v Farmers' Properties. Inc..

865 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah App. 1993); Gramlich v Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131,1132 (Utah 1992);
United Park Mines Co. v Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Jacobson Inv.
Co. v State Tax Comm's. 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); Sanders v Ovard. 838 P.2d 1134,
1135 (Utah 1992); Commercial Union Assocs. v Clavton. 863 P.2d 29; 36 (Utah App. 1993);
Gravson v Finlinson. 119 UAR 29 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTION. STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 19, 1993, Jenny Lynn Poulsen, Appellant, Petitioner and Plaintiff,
hereafter Poulsen, and Gregory J. Griffiths, hereafter Griffiths, filed a Petition for Formal
Adjudication of Intestacy and Formal Application of Personal Representative for Decedent's
estate. (R. 1-14) Clinton Leo Howes, hereafter Howes, filed an Objection to the aforesaid
Petition. (R. 16-25)
Thereafter, voluminous papers were filed regarding the handling of the Estate,
discovery and numerous and various disputes between the parties. (R. 42-386) On November
12, 1993 a hearing was held (R. 382) where various matters were determined and resulted in
the order filed on November 17, 1993. (R. 387-389) It was in this order that Poulsen's and
Griffiths' challenge to the validity of a "Joint Tenancy" was reserved for trial. (R. 388)
A scheduling conference was held on November 23, 1993 when a trial was set
for April 26, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. (R. 424) The disputes between the parties continued regarding
the handling of the probate estate and discovery matters until the date of the first day of the trial
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on April 26, 1994. (R. 588) No pleadings had been filed by the parties and there was no
document outlining the issues involved except the Order (R. 387-388) above referred to.
The case was tried on April 26, May 11, and June 15, 1994. (R. 664) Several
times during the trial the trial court tried to formulate the issues. The following colloquy took
place between the trial court and counsel:
THE COURT: The issue is whether or not it is, as I understand it, is whether
or not, number one, it's a partnership, the house is an asset in a partnership between Mr.
GriffithsMR. BYBEE: Greg Griffiths.
THE COURT: -and the deceased, or whether there is true joint tenancy; is that
correct?
MR. BYBEE: That's correct. (R. 1083)
And further:
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. As I understand the state of this case,
the personal property is not an issue in this matter. That's still going to be resolved in probate.
The personal representative will resolve that, and so the only issue is the joint tenancy of the
home; whether that's a partnership or not. (R. 1141)
After the trial, the trial court issued its memorandum decision on September 2,
1994. (R. 642-647) Counsel for Howes prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and served the same on Poulsen and Griffiths on or about September 29, 1994.
On October 5, 1994, Poulsen and Griffiths, Pro Se, filed objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code
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of Judicial Administration. (R. 648-651) Counsel for Howes filed a Reply to Poulsen's and
Griffiths' Objections. (R. 654-659)
The trial court ruled on Poulsen's and Griffiths' objections on November 1, 1994
in a minute entry (R. 661-663) and directed that counsel for Howes prepare new Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. The original proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment were never filed and thus it is impossible to determine exactly
what specific language was objected to.
On November 21, 1994 the trial court entered the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment based on presumably the original proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and the rulings of the Court on November 1, 1994. (R.
664-679)
On December 12, 1994 Poulsen filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal from
an Interlocutory Order, meaning the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of
the trial court entered on November 21, 1994. Poulsen's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was
granted by the Utah Supreme Court per Chief Justice Zimmerman on February 16, 1995.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Griffiths and Decedent, known during her lifetime as Catherine Griffiths,
Catherine Howes, Marion Catherine Griffiths, Marion K. Griffiths, M. Catherine Howes, M.
Catherine Howes, Marian Smith, and M. Smith, married prior to 1951. (R. 1272, 1273).
There were two children as issue of this marriage, Gregory J. Griffiths and Jenny Lynn Poulsen,
referred to respectively as Griffiths and Poulsen. (R. 1018) Ronald G. Griffiths was Decedent's
son by a previous marriage. (R. 1018)
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In June, 1963 the subject real property located at 5160 South Highland Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah, was purchased by John Griffiths and Decedent, and was later known as the
Stevenson House, hereafter referred to as Stevenson House. (R. 1017, 1119, 1272) John
Griffiths and Decedent were divorced in 1967 (R. 1019) and thereafter fee simple title to the
Stevenson House was vested in Decedent. (R. 1274)
In 1969 Decedent married Clinton Leo Howes, hereafter Howes, (R. 1023) and
after the wedding Howes moved into Stevenson House. (R. 1461) Howes no longer cohabited
with Defendant in Stevenson House as of 1979 (R. 1002) or 1975 (R. 1022) or as early as 1971.
(R. 1217) Poulsen lived in Stevenson House until her marriage in 1971 (R. 1119) and Griffiths
lived in Stevenson House until his marriage in 1977. (R. 1280)
In 1978 it became necessary to refinance Stevenson House in that the mortgage
payments were in arrears and a bill was owed to Holladay Lumber. (R. 1279) A loan for
$55,000 was obtained from Western Savings and Loan (R. 1277-1279) but because of the lack
of credit on the part of Decedent and Howes, Western Savings required the signatures of
Griffiths and his wife Deborah Griffiths on the loan. (R. 1274, 1275) A Warranty Deed was
executed in connection with this loan from Western Savings and Gregory Griffiths, Debbie
Griffiths were added to the title and for the first time Howes name was added to the title of the
Stevenson House with all grantees being joint tenants. (Exhibit 34; R. 1275-1279)
By 1983 Decedent and Griffiths had contemplated opening a wedding reception
center at 5160 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah to be known as Stevenson House.
(R. 1284, 1285, 1291) The condition of the Stevenson House was deplorable and repairs and
remodeling were necessary to get Stevenson House started and a Small Business Administration
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Disaster Loan in the sum of $12,100 was obtained through Guardian State Bank by all four fee
simple owners. (Exhibit 35; R. 1282, 1283) The first weddings were held at the Stevenson
House Wedding Reception Center in 1984 (R. 1293, 1335) with the said business being owned
by Decedent and Gregory Griffiths as equal partners. (Exhibits 38 through 45; R. 1294).
The wedding reception business continued at the subject real property known as
Stevenson House through 1985, 1986 and 1987 when Decedent and Griffiths determined that the
existing facilities were too small to handle big and more profitable weddings and needed an
addition. (R. 1311, 1312) Griffiths arranged for a second SBA loan from the Guardian State
Bank in 1988 (R. 1313) in the sum of $117,000. (Exhibit 113)
The loan application was approved by the Small Business Administration on
September 23, 1988 in the names of "C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes, dba:
STEVENSON HOUSE RECEPTION CENTER.w (Exhibit 113) Griffiths was paid $40,000 out
of the loan proceeds for his interest in Stevenson House. (Exhibit 107; R. 668-670, 673) A
Warranty Deed was prepared by Guardian State Bank in connection with this loan transaction
and was executed and recorded transferring title to the subject real property known as Stevenson
House from Clinton Howes, Marion K. Griffiths, Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths
to C. Leo Howes and M. Katherine Howes without any indication of joint tenancy. (Exhibit 81)
An increase in the amount of the loan from $117,000 to $135,000 was approved by the SBA on
February 3, 1989. (Exhibit 113)
The trial court found as a matter of fact that Decedent and Howes conveyed
Stevenson House to themselves as joint tenants on March 10, 1989 and that Stevenson House
was in joint tenancy between Decedent and Howes at the time of her death on September 22,
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1992 and that Decedent's share devolved on Howes by operation of law. (R. 665, 666, 671;
Findings of Fact No. 9, 10 and 38)
On December 12, 1994 Poulsen, Pro Se, filed, in the Utah Supreme Court, a
Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order referring to the trial courts
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered on November 21, 1994. The
petition was granted by the Utah Supreme Court per Chief Justice Michael B. Zimmerman on
February 16, 1995 which Interlocutory Appeal was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals
on the same day.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 38 and the Conclusions of Law and Judgment based
thereon are not supported by the evidence and there has been a total failure of evidence
regarding the joint tenancy of the parties based a purported quit claim deed not in evidence as
an exhibit or without any testimony in support thereof. There is also a failure to establish a joint
tenancy because of the failure of proof to show the unities of interest and possession and the
statutory requirement that the interest in the property be equal and undivided.
There is no evidence that Decedent and Howes were joint tenants as of the date
of her death and the only evidence as to the state of the title as of Decedent's death was the 1988
warranty deed creating a tenancy in common between Decedent and Howes and one-half of the
subject real property known as Stevenson House Reception Center should go to Decedent's
estate.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE
STEVENSON HOUSE WAS OWNED BY DECEDENT AND C. LEO HOWES AS JOINT
TENANTS AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
STEVENSON HOUSE DEVOLVED ON C. LEO HOWES BY OPERATION OF LAW.
Finding of Fact 9 states:
On March 10, 1989, C. Leo Howes and M. Katherine Howes
conveyed the property to themselves, C. Leo Howes and M.
Catherine Howes, as joint tenants.
Finding of Fact 10 states:
At the time of Catherine Howes' death, title to the property was
held in the name of C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes as
joint tenants.
Finding of Fact 38 states:
The property in question was held in joint tenancy between Clinton
Leo Howes and Marion Catherine Griffiths at the time of her
death, and upon her death the Decedent's share by operation of
law passed to Clinton Leo Howes.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the "clearly erroneous" standard of review in
Consolidated Coal Co. v Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry. 886 P.2d 514, 519 (Utah 1994)
as follows:
The party challenging the trial court's factual findings has the
heavy burden of establishing that those findings are not supported
by substantial and competent evidence. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). To meet this burden,
'an appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the
8

finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below.' Reid v Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989).
Evidence in Support of the Foregoing Findings
There was a colloquy between the trial court and counsel at (R. 1084) where a
joint tenancy deed was referred to but not identified. It could well have referred to the 1978
deed, trial Exhibit 34. There is also a reference, proclaimed as hearsay by the witness, that
Stevenson House was owned by Decedent and Howes as joint tenants but he did not see any
documentation. (R. 1230, 1231)
Howes testified as follows:
Q.

Where do you currently reside, Mr. Howes?

A.

5160 Highland Drive.

Q.

Is that the home that is the subject of this litigation today?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Is that your home?

A.

Yes. (R. 1461)

However, Howes failed to testify how Stevenson House got to be his home.
Evidence, or Lack Thereof. Against the Foregoing Findings
No conveyance or purported quit claim deed dated March 10, 1989 was ever
introduced into evidence at the time of trial nor was there any testimony as to its due execution,
delivery, recording, consideration therefor, the intent of Decedent or the parties or acceptance.
There was no documentary evidence introduced at the trial to show the state of
the title of Stevenson House at the time of Decedent's death nor was there any testimony on that

subject.
The last clause of Finding 38 is a Conclusion of Law for which there is no factual
basis.
The issue of joint tenancy was first raised and asserted by Howes in an Objection
filed on April 19, 1993 (R. 16, 17) wherein a Warranty Deed is attached as Exhibit "C." (R.
24) However, the Warranty Deed is trial Exhibit 81 which is a conveyance to Decedent and
Howes without any designation as joint tenants and is thus a tenancy in common in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5, infra.

There is a loose Quit Claim Deed included in the

Objection dated March 10, 1989 quitclaiming Stevenson House from Decedent and Howes to
Decedent and Howes as joint tenants. (R. 23)
The issue of the purported joiAt tenancy was again raised and asserted by Howes
in a Memorandum filed July 16, 1993. (R. 58) This memorandum incorporates as paragraph
4 (R. 59) an affidavit of Howes regarding the status of the title to Stevenson House. The
affidavit of Howes at paragraph 4 (R. 64) refers to the Deed he relies on to establish a joint
tenancy as between he and Decedent as Exhibit WC.H Exhibit WCM once again turns out to be
trial Exhibit 81 creating a tenancy in common as between Decedent and Howes. (R. 69) There
is a loose Quit Claim Deed dated March 10, 1989 quitclaiming Stevenson House to Decedent
and Howes as joint tenants. (R. 70)
The issue of the purported joint tenancy was again raised and asserted by Howes
in the memorandum filed September 28, 1993, (R. 285, 286, 293, 298) which filing is almost
identical to the memorandum of July 16, 1993 (R. 58) including trial Exhibit 81 and the loose
Quit Claim Deed as before. (R. 299)
Poulsen finally filed a Petition on October 25, 1993 challenging the validity of the
joint tenancy asserted by Howes (R. 333-346) to which Howes filed a Memorandum in
10

Opposition (R. 353-358) and the trial court specifically reserved the issue of the validity of the
alleged joint tenancy for trial. (R. 338)
The burden was on Howes to introduce a duly authenticated conveyance in order
to raise certain presumptions in his favor or at least testify as to some of the facts that would
prove by a preponderance of evidence that a joint tenancy existed as between himself and
Decedent. The purported deed of March 10, 1989 is inadmissible as evidence because of Rules
901, 902 and 1005, Utah Rules of Evidence.
The only evidence as to the state of the title at the time of Decedent's death was
the Warranty Deed of October 11, 1988 (Exhibit 81) which is governed by the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5 which provides in part as follows:
Every interest in real estate granted to two or more persons in
their own right shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly
declared in the grant to be otherwise. Use of words wjoint
tenancy" or "with rights of survivorship" or "and to the survivor
of them" or words similar import shall declare a joint tenancy.
In all cases the interest of joint tenants must be equal and undivided.
Thus, upon the death of Decedent, a one-half interest in the subject real property known as
Stevenson House passed to her estate.
The Utah Supreme Court in Baker v Pattee. 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984), stated as
follows at 684 P.2d 635:
Where a deed is executed with no intent to transfer a present
interest, it will be invalidated by a court in equity. Curtiss v
Ferris. 168 Colo. 480, 452 P.2d 38 (1969). This Court has held
that a conveyance is valid only upon delivery of a deed with
present intent to transfer, Given v Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351
P.2d (1960).
There is nothing in the record on appeal or in the trial record showing any intent
11

on the part of Decedent to create a joint tenancy in Stevenson House with herself and Howes.
In fact, the only evidence before the trial court with respect to the intent shows that Decedent
did not intend to create a joint tenancy with Howes. (R. 1251, 1252)
Griffiths' witness Joan Harrison worked at Stevenson House from 1988 until 1990
(R. 1187) and whose testimony relating to Griffiths' partnership interest in Stevenson House
after 1988 was devastating to Griffiths (R. 1189) testified as follows with respect to Howes being
placed on the deed:
Q

And did she ever talk to you about why she let his name be put on the
deed?

A

Well, I think they said that he had helped her, you know, went with her
when she went to get the one loan. And I think that was the main reason,
was that he was-had established a work and that he needed to have
signatures.

Q

Did she say anything about whether it was her intention that he would
acquire some interest in the property because of that?

A

No. She never did say that.

Stevenson House was owned by Decedent as her sole and separate property from
1967 until 1978. She married Howes in 1969 and in 1978 a loan was obtained from Western
Savings and the title to Stevenson House was changed from Decedent to Decedent, Howes,
Griffiths and Griffiths' wife Deborah as joint tenants.
A new SBA loan for $117,000 was obtained in 1988 from Guardian State Bank
by Howes and Decedent "dba STEVENSON HOUSE RECEPTION CENTER" secured by a
trust deed where a new warranty deed was executed and recorded with Decedent and Howes
being tenants in common. (Exhibits 81, 113) This warranty deed severed the joint tenancy
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existing between Decedent and Howes by virtue of the warranty deed of 1978. Knickerbocker
v Cannon. 285 UAR 3 (Utah 1996).
The amount of the loan was increased to $135,000 on February 3, 1989 and
suddenly a quit claim deed dated March 10, 1989 surfaces which was not introduced into
evidence nor any testimony adduced as to its execution, recording, purpose, consideration
therefor, intent of Decedent or the parties or acceptance.
The only reason Howes was ever added to the title of Stevenson House in 1978
and 1988 was for credit purposes and because Guardian State Bank or the SB A or both wanted
Howes name on the property because it made a "well rounded loan package/ (R. 1194, 1251,
1252, 1275-1279, 1315)
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the four unities of time, title,
interest and possession are necessary to create a valid joint tenancy, Larsen v Paynes. 122 P.2d
429 (Utah 1943) reversed on other grounds 133 P.2d 785 (Utah 1943) and that severance of any
one of the four unities terminates the joint tenancy and converts it to a tenancy in common.
Knickerbocker v Cannon, supra.
While the unities of time and title may have been eliminated by statute, Utah Code
Ann. §57-1-5, supra, and the decided cases, it is submitted that the unities of interest and
possession have not been repudiated. A tenancy in common has the unity of possession as its
only unity.
Three witnesses testified that Howes did not reside at Stevenson House from as
late as 1979 and further that he did not have a bedroom at Stevenson House. (R. 1002)
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There is abundant testimony that he had nothing to do with the running of
Stevenson House Reception Center from its inception in 1984 to 1988 (R. 985, 994, 1165-1168,
1177) or in fact from 1988 to the death of Decedent in 1992. (R. 1181, 1191) Decedent and
Griffiths names were on the business licenses from 1988 to 1992. (Exhibit 41)
The entire trial record shows clearly that Howes had no interest in or right to
possession to the subject real property known as Stevenson House Reception Center or that the
Decedent and Howes interest was equal and undivided as required by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5,
supra. In Thompson On Real Property. §31.09 discusses "The Future of the Law of Joint
Tenancies" as follows:
Blackstone long ago conceded that 'in general it is advantageous
for the joint tenants to dissolve the jointure; since thereby the right
of survivorship is taken away, and each may transmit his own part
to his own heirs.' Misgivings about the right of survivorship may
explain the joint tenant's anomalous power to alienate; they
certainly explain some modern cases recognizing a severance in
situations short of the destruction of one of the time-hallowed
unities.
The erosion of the doctrine of the four unities in cases involving
both the creation and severance of joint tenancies has greatly
reduced the technical distinction between this form of concurrent
ownership and tenancies in common. The driving force here has
been the increased emphasis on intention: intention has always
been important in the law, but heretofore it was as important that
it be expressed in stereotyped legal forms. The law of joint
tenancies is approaching, although it has not yet reached, the point
at which two or more persons owning property together may hold
in joint tenancy only if and so long as they intended to do so.
(Emphasis added)
The Utah Legislature in enacting Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5, supra, has shown a
preference for tenancy in common and in effect eliminating the unities of time and title and
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paradoxically retaining and requiring the unities of interest and possession because of the last
sentence of the statute which provides:
In all cases the interest of joint tenants must be equal and
undivided.
Thus, it is submitted that in order uphold the validity of a joint tenancy there must
be strict proof of interest and possession. There must be genuine, not stereotyped, proof of the
intent of the parties.
Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 38 are not supported by the evidence nor are any of
the Conclusions of Law and Judgment based thereon.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment of the trial court entered on November 21, 1994 and enter judgment that Decedent was
a tenant in common as to Howes at the time of her death and that one-half of the subject real
property known as Stevenson House belongs to the Estate of Decedent or alternatively remand
the cause to the trial court to take evidence on the purported joint tenancy.

Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Appellant Lynn Poulsen

Lynn Poulsen, Pro Se
Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
MARION CATHERINE HOWES,
Decedent.

)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Judge Noel

Civil No. 933900381 ES

The above-captioned matter came on for trial on April 26, May 11, and June
15, 1994. Respondent, Clinton Leo Howes ("Defendant") was represented by his
attorneys Bruce H. Shapiro and Jeffrey W. Wilkinson, Petitioner Gregory Griffiths was
represented by his attorney Don By bee, and Petitioner Lynn Poulsen was representing
herself pro se (collectively "Plaintiffs"). After having heard the testimony of the
respective parties and witnesses, together with the introduction of various exhibits, the
court hereby makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The property which is the subject of this trial is located at 5160 S.

Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah, which is more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the West line of Highland Drive,
said point being North 1335.05 feet and West 198.22 feet from
the Southeast corner of Section 9, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
89°55' West 154.28 feet; thence North 01°32'20" East 114.97
feet; thence North 6°38' East 69.73 feet; thence South
89o29'10" East 45.51 feet; thence South 83°36f00" East
102.91 feet to the West line of Highland Drive; thence South
lo32'20" West 172.59 feet along said line to point of
BEGINNING.
2.

The property consists of land and a home.

3.

Since in or about 1984 the subject home has also been used as a

wedding reception center doing business under the name Stevenson House.
4.

On September 22, 1992, Catherine Howes passed away in the home

located at 5160 S. Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.
5.

At the time of her death Catharine Howes was married to Clinton Leo

6.

Catherine Howes used different names during her lifetime which

Howes.

included Marion Catherine Griffiths, Marion K. Griffiths, M. Catherine Howes, and M.
Katherine Howes, all of which refer to the Decedent.
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7.

In June of 1978, the decedent, Marion Catherine Griffiths, and

Clinton Leo Howes, husband and wife, conveyed the property to Clinton Howes and
Marion K. Griffiths as husband and wife and Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths
as husband and wife as joint tenants.
8.

On October 11, 1988, Clinton Howes, Marion K. Griffiths, Gregory

J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the property by warranty deed to C. Leo
Howes and M. Catherine Howes.
9.

On March 10, 1989, C. Leo Howes and M. Katherine Howes

conveyed the property to themselves, C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes, as joint
tenants.
10.

At the time of Catherine Howes' death, title to the property was held

in the name of C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes as joint tenants.
11.

The parties have stipulated as to the appointment of a personal

representative and the disposition as to the appointment and issues addressing other matters
besides the real property and partnership claim are reserved.
12.

The only issue brought before the court in this trial is the treatment of

the deeds in question, title and disposition of the real property, a partnership claim and the
extent of Mr. Griffiths1 ownership, if any, in the subject real property.
13.

The language of the deed of October 11, 1988, whereupon Clinton

Howes, Marion K. Griffiths, Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the
4000.
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property by warranty deed to C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes is clear and
unambiguous, and in order for Plaintiffs to attack the deed they must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the deed was entered into by mutual mistake, duress, or undue
influence.
14.

The Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence nor argued any fraud.

15.

The Plaintiffs have failed to establish by even a preponderance of the

evidence that the deed of October 11, 1988, was signed by Gregory J. Griffiths, Deborah
S. Griffiths, or the decedent as a result of duress or undue influence.
16.

The Plaintiffs have failed to establish by even a preponderance of the

evidence that the deed of March 10, 1989, was signed by the decedent as the result of
duress or undue influence.
17.

The only evidence presented to this court on the issue of duress or

undue influence was the disputed testimony that Defendant Clinton Leo Howes refused to
sign on an SBA loan to improve the premises unless the Gregory and Deborah Griffiths
were removed from the title on the subject property.
18.

The evidence introduced at trial established that Defendant did not

make such a demand with respect to the SBA loan, but even if he had this would not be
sufficient grounds on which to base a claim of undue influence or duress.
19.

The Decedent, in spite of certain eccentricities and idiosyncrasies was

intelligent, alert, capable of managing her own business affairs, and at all material times
4000.
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could understand banking and business transactions, and was not acting in a diminished
capacity at the time of execution of the subject deeds.
20.

The evidence presented at trial established that the Decedent "had a

mind of her own" and was "strong willed" and not subject to the influence of others.
21.

There is no credible evidence that the Decedent, Gregory Griffiths or

Deborah Griffiths acted under duress or undue influence when they executed the October
11, iy»s, deed.
22.

There is no credible evidence that the Decedent, acted under duress or

undue influence when she executed the March 10, 1989, deed.
23.

The issue of mistake was not presented to the court in a clear and

precise manner, but the court reviewed said claim as grounded upon the assertion that the
Decedent and Mr. Griffiths intended to continue to operate as a partnership after 1988
when the SBA loan was made and Gregory and Deborah Griffiths transferred their interest
in the property under the mistaken belief that the deeds would not affect Mr. Griffiths'
partnership tenancy or interest in the property.
24.

There was no credible evidence presented that the decedent, Gregory

Griffiths or Deborah Griffiths, acted under either a mutual or unilateral mistake when the
October 11, 1988 and March 10, 1989 deeds were executed.
25.

While there was oral testimony that Gregory Griffiths was on the

premises and seemed to have a hand in the business after October 1988 and up until the
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death of Catherine Howes, there was no testimony presented other than that of Mr.
Griffiths himself that there was indeed a partnership, and the court finds such testimony
not credible and without merit.
26.

The oral testimony established that the Decedent had stated to others

that after the SBA loan in September of 1988, and the payment of $40,000 to Plaintiff
Griffiths that Mr. Griffiths stated to others that he was now "bought out" and that they
(Decedent and Mr. Griffiths) were now "even Steven/
27.

The testimony also established that Gregory Griffiths himself had

reported that he had been bought out of the partnership at about the same time.
28.

The evidence presented at trial established that after 1988 Mr.

Griffiths was no longer in control of any Stevenson House bank account, and had no
signing authority, whereas prior to 1988 Mr. Griffiths did have signing authority and
signed many of the Stevenson House checks.
29.

No evidence was presented at trial to establish that there were any

partnership records including financial records that would reflect a partnership after 1988.
30.

The evidence presented at trial established that Mr. Griffiths did not

sign on the SBA loan which was obtained in September of 1988 for improvement of the
home.
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31.

The evidence presented at trial established that after 1988 Mr.

Griffiths1 tax returns did not show partnership income from the Stevenson House as many
of his prior tax returns had done.
32.

The evidence presented at trial established that Mr. Griffiths' 1988

federal income tax return treats the receipt of the $40,000 as proceeds from the sale of the
subject property, with a taxable gain of $10,452.
33.

Mr. Griffiths1 tax treatment of the subject property on his 1988 tax

return is entirely inconsistent with Mr. Griffiths1 claim that $40,000 was repayment to him
for funds which he had earlier loaned to the partnership.
34.

The evidence presented at trial established that Plaintiffs did not make

any mortgage payments on the subject property after 1988.
35.

The Stevenson House account whereupon both the Decedent and Mr.

Griffiths had been signatories was closed in or about November of 1988.
36.

The parties did not intend to continue their partnership after 1988 and

did not intend that the building wherein the business was conducted would continue after
1988 as partnership property with Greg Griffiths as one of the partners.
37.

The court finds that Greg Griffiths' interest in the partnership and in

the subject property was bought out in 1988, and that any partnership interest which may
have existed was terminated at that time.
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38.

The property in question was held in joint tenancy between Clinton

Leo Howes and Marion Catherine Griffiths at the time of her death, and upon her death the
Decedent's share by operation of law passed to Clinton Leo Howes.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters its
Conclusions of Law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The property which is the subject of this litigation, is located at 5160

S. Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah, which is more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the West line of Highland Drive,
said point being North 1335.05 feet and West 198.22 feet from
the Southeast corner of Section 9, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
89°55' West 154.28 feet; thence North 01°32,20'' East 114.97
feet; thence North 6°38' East 69.73 feet; thence South
89o29'10" East 45.51 feet; thence South 83°36,0O" East
102.91 feet to the West line of Highland Drive; thence South
1°32*20" West 172.59 feet along said line to point of
BEGINNING.
2.

On September 22, 1992, Catherine Howes passed away in the home

located at 5160 South Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah.
3.

At the time of her death Catherine Howes was married to Clinton

Leo Howes.
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4.

Catherine Howes used different names during her lifetime which

included Marion Catherine Griffiths, Marion K. Griffiths, M. Catherine Howes, and M.
Katherine Howes, all of which refer to the Decedent.
5.

In June of 1978, the Decedent, Marion Catherine Griffiths, and

Clinton Howes, husband and wife, conveyed the property to Clinton Howes and Marion
K. Griffiths as husband and wife and Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths as
husband and wife as joint tenants.
6.

At the time of Catherine Howes1 death, title to the property was held

in the name of C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes as joint tenants.
7.

Issues addressing other matters besides the treatment of the deeds in

question, title and disposition of the real property and partnership claim are reserved for a
later date.
8.

The deed of October 11, 1988, whereupon Clinton Howes, Marion K.

Griffiths, Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the property by
Warranty Deed to C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes is clear and unambiguous.
9.

The Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence nor argued any fraud.

10.

The Plaintiffs have failed to establish by even a preponderance of the

evidence that the deed of October 11, 1988, was signed by Gregory J. Griffiths and
Deborah S. Griffiths, or the Decedent, as a result of duress or undue influence.
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11.

The Plaintiffs have failed establish by even a preponderance of the

evidence that the deed of March 10, 1989, was signed by the Decedent as a result of duress
or undue influence.
12.

The Plaintiffs have failed to establish that either a mutual or unilateral

mistake occurred when the October 11, 1988 or the March 10, 1989 deeds were executed.
13.

The Decedent was intelligent, alert, capable of managing her own

business affairs, and at all material times could understand banking and business
transactions, and was in no way acting in a diminished capacity at the time of execution of
the subject deeds.
14.

The Plaintiff, Gregory Griffiths, was bought out of the partnership

and the real property in 1988, and any partnership interest that may have existed was
terminated at this time.
15.

The property in question was held in joint tenancy between Clinton

Leo Howes and Marion Catherine Griffiths at the time of her death. Upon her death the
Decedent's share by operation of law passed to Clinton Leo Howes.
16.

Ownership interest of the property is quieted in so far as it relates to

any claim of Plaintiffs.
17.

Defendant, Clinton Leo Howes, is entitled to the real property free

and clear of any and all claims of the Plaintiffs.
18.

The Plaintiffs are permanently enjoined from asserting any adverse

claim to Defendant's title of the real property referenced above.

19.

All restraining orders and injunctions previously issued by this court

shall be lifted as against the subject property.
20.

The Lis Pendens recorded by Gregory Griffiths shall be released and

removed from the subject property.

DATED thisc2LU d a y

of

November,

Frank G/^Joel District Coi^.Judge^^'
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 5 day of November, 1994, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was hand delivered to:
Jennie Lynn Poulsen
3353 South Main, #227
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Don Bybee
Attorney at Law
2805 S. State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Miles Lignell
Attorney at Law
330 East 400 South, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Bruce H. Shapiro (Bar No. 4761)
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO, P.C.
3760 S. Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 273-3314
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Deputy Ctork

Jeffrey W. Wilkinson (Bar No. 3754)
JEFFREY W. WILKINSON, P.C.
3760 S. Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 273-3909
Attorneys for Clinton Leo Howes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

)

MARION CATHERINE HOWES,

)
)
)
)

Decedent.

JUDGMENT

Civil No. 933900381 ES
Judge Noel

The above-captioned matter came on for trial on April 26, May 11, and June
15, 1994. Respondent, Clinton Leo Howes ("Defendant") was represented by his
attorneys Bruce H. Shapiro and Jeffrey W. Wilkinson, Petitioner Gregory Griffiths was
represented by his attorney Don Bybee, and Petitioner Lynn Poulsen was representing
herself pro se (collectively "Plaintiffs"). After having heard the testimony of the
respective parties and witnesses, together with the introduction of various exhibits, and the

court having previously made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
and good cause appearing therefore, now makes and enters the following judgment:

1.

The real property which is the subject of this litigation is located at

5160 South Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah, which is more particularly described as
follows:

BEGINNING at a point on the West line of Highland Drive,
said point being North 1335.05 feet and West 198.22 feet from
the Southeast corner of Section 9, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
89°55' West 154.28 feet; thence North 01°32'20" East 114.97
feet; thence North 6°38' East 69.73 feet; thence South
89°29'10" East 45.51 feet; thence South 83o36'0(T East
102.91 feet to the West line of Highland Drive; thence South
1°32'20" West 172.59 feet along said line to point of
BEGINNING.
2.

At the time of the Decedent's death, the property in question was held

in joint tenancy between Clinton Leo Howes and Marion Catherine Griffiths, and upon her
death, the Decedent's share passed to Clinton Leo Howes.
3.

Gregory Griffiths' interest in the partnership and in the real property

was bought out in 1988 and any partnership interest which may have existed was
terminated at that time.
4.

Ownership interest in the real property should be quieted in so far as

it relates to any claim of Plaintiffs.
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5.

The Defendant is entitled to the real property free and clear of all

claims of the Plaintiffs.
6.

The Plaintiffs are permanently enjoined from asserting any adverse

claim to Defendant's title to the real property.
7.

All restraining orders and injunctions previously issued by the court

are lifted as against the real property.
8.

The Lis Pendens recorded by Gregory Griffiths shall be released and

removed from the real property. J _
DATED this^J/

day of November, 1994,

Frank 1%. NofeF£S%
District'"
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